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Alimony, Property Division, and the
Modern-Day Wife
HARRY L. SnbAD, JR.

Two Virginia cases prompt this note: In one the court was
concerned with alimony and a working wife (Baytop v. Baytop, 199 Va. 388, 100 S. E. 2d 14 (1957)); the other involved
a property settlement between. a husband and a working wife
who had used her inheritance to purchase real estate. (Smith
v. Smith, 200 Va. 77, 104 S. E. 2d 17 (1958).
Alimony and the Working Wife
In Baytop v. Baytop, supra,Lillian Baytop, age 40, and her
husband, age 44, were schoolteachers. The parties had taught
school before marriage and both continued to teach during the
period of their marriage. However, husband and wife had
never formed a common household because the wife taught in
Virginia and the husband taught in Delaware and both maintained apartments in the locality of their respective jobs.
This arrangement for separate households was mutually
agreed upon for many years but the court found, from conflicting evidence, that toward the latter part of the marriage
the wife attempted to have the husband establish a common
household. The husband owned a small farm and had acquired
some equity in a tractor. The marriage had existed about
seven years when the wife instituted suit for divorce on the
ground of cruelty.
The trial court found cruelty, decreed a divorce, and, because the wife had "resigned" her teaching job due to a
nervous condition allegedly caused by the husband's cruelty,
awarded the wife $150.00 a month as alimony.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, by a five to two
decision, reversed that part of the decree awarding alimony
and held that under the facts and circumstances existing at
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the time of the appeal (the wife had "resumed" work) no
alimony should be awarded.
It is hoped that this case will not be interpreted as standingfor the proposition that because a working wife earns approximately as much as her husband she is not entitled to alimony.
Properly interpreted, it does not. Some of the pivotal facts
which enter into the complex question of whether the working
wife should collect alimony are suggested by the observation
of the majority justices that:
For many years she has earned a salary that is ample
to maintain her in the station in life to which she has
been accustomed, both before and during her marriage.
199 Va. 388, 395, 100 S. E. 2d 14, 19. (Emphasis added.)
The unique facts of absences of a common household and
pooling of funds in Baytop caused no lowering of the living
standaid of the wife upon the dissolution of the marriage and
would justify the court in denying alimony when, and if,
lowering of the wife's living standard is the sole factor to be
taken into account in fixing alimony.
A Wife Should Be Compensated In Divorce Proceedings
For A Loss of Earning Capacity Caused by Certain Torts
Of the Husband.
Justices do not always articulate what may have been
the conscious or unconscious reasons for their conclusions.
Speculation as to the underlying meaning of judges' conclusions, like speculation as to a poem's "real meaning", is
hazardous business. This, however, is a risk the teaching
profession finds attractive.
What is a possible explanation for the dissent in Baytop
by Mr. Justice Buchanan, joined in by Mr. Justice Spratley?
The opening sentence of that opinion is suggestive:
I disagree with the conclusion that there should not be
an allowance of any alimony in this case. The court finds
the facts to be that the husband never established a home
for his wife; that he humiliated her, was rude and indif-
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ferent to her and engaged in illicit relations with another
woman; and that his conduct over a long period of time
adversely affected her health and nervous system to the
point where she was justified in leaving him because she
had taken all she could take. 199 Va. 388, 395.
The mood conveyed is that of tort, of wrong for which
compensation should be awarded, and it is submitted that
upon divorce an injured wife or husband should be permitted
to recover at least for loss of earning capacity caused by
intentional wrongs or torts committed by the other spouse
during the existence of the marriage relation. See Abbott v.
Abbott, 67 Me. 304 (1877); Shultz v. Christopher, 65 Wash.
496; 118 P. 629 (1911) (in which the court held that damages
to a former wife caused by the husband giving her a venereal
disease were presumed to have been settled in the divorce suit
when the court adjusted the property rights of the parties) ;
McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations, 43
Harv. L. Rev. 1030, 1041-50 (1930)).
Is the above suggestion at odds with settled Virginia law?
Although as of 1955 fourteen states had repudiated the rule
of inter-spousal immunity to tort actions (20 NACCA L. J.
118-119 (1958), Furey v. Furey, 193 Va. 727, 71 S. E. 2d 191
(1952) states, and Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Bennett, 197 Va. 216, 89
S. E. 2d 69 (1955) reaffirms, that in Virginia neither husband
nor wife can recover for personal torts committed by one upon
the other. The court purports to rest this rule on its construction of the Married Women's statute as not destroying
the legal identity of husband and wife and hence no cause of
action can exist. Keister's Admr. v. Keister's Ex'ors., 123 Va.
157, 96 S.E. 315 (1918). This is no more than a statement of a
conclusion.
However, for personal torts which are not insured against
the Virginia rule stated above finds rational support in (1)
the undesirability of dislocating the control of family financial matters by awarding the funds of one spouse to the other,
and (2) a realization that for marriages to survive the partners must endure much conduct that would be tortious if directed toward a third party. See McCurdy, op cit., at 1054-56.
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For personal torts which are customarily insured against
(usually the negligent torts) the Virginia rule finds rational
support in a desire to thwart collusive suits by husband and
wife for the purpose of milking insurance companies, and it
also finds rational support in the wisdom of not allowing a
wrongdoer to profit from his own wrong and thereby discouraging a high degree of care. Cf. McCurdy, op. cit., at
1050-56. (In Midkiff v. Midkiff, 201 Va. 829, 113 S. E. 2d 875
(1960), it was held that an unemancipated infant may maintain a tort action against his unemancipated brother. The court
said at page 833 of the Virginia report: "Fraud is never presumed. . . . Courts should never immunize tort-feasors because of the possibility of fraud and collusion.... If fraud
and collusion do exist in an action between brothers, they may
be ferreted out in the same manner in which courts and
juries handle that situation in other cases." For obvious
reasons fraud or collusion is much less likely between brothers than between a husband and wife who share both a common bed and many common purposes in life. The result in the
cited case may rest upon this obvious distinction or it may
presage the collapse of the Virginia rule of inter-spousal immunity. In the event Virginia retreats from inter-spousal
immunity, an approach mid-way between presuming fraud
and closing our eyes to realities may be appropriate: Where
insurance is involved the claim should be viewed with suspicion and all pure facts proved by clear and convincing evidence; the ultimate "facts" of negligence, causation, and injury could remain subject to the preponderance rule.)
Rational bases for a rule denying the wronged spouse recovery for personal torts committed by the other are lacking
where: (1) the recovery is sought upon dissolution o! the marriage, and (2) the wrong is of a type which is typically not
insured against, and (3) the wrong is so severe that it should
not have to be tolerated even by the partners to a marriage.
Intentional, as distinguished from negligent, personal torts
usually are not insured against; where the wrong has been so
severe that it has reduced earning capacity it should not have
to be tolerated even in marriage. But, to discourage hasty dis-

246

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW NOTES

solutions of salvageable marriages by wives who might hope
to use the action to acquire independent wealth, recovery
could be limited to compensation for loss of earning capacity.
Of great significance here is the realization that if it is
indeed tort damages to which the wife (or husband) is entitled
then (1) such payments could and should be awarded to such
a party even though his conduct furnished grounds for the
divorce, and (2) payments of this kind, or portion, of "alimony" should survive re-marriage, and (3) the party whose
earning capacity has been reduced should collect compensation even though he or she may be earning more than the other
party. Compensation for such injuries could also be made by
or in the property division between husband and wife. See
Shultz v. Christopher, supra, and the latter portions of this
note.
The following hypothetical case illustrates the justice of
the above suggestions: A husband, earning $5000 a year,
without provocation shoots his wife in the hand thereby destroying her capacity to earn money as a court reporter; her
earning capacity is reduced from $6000 to $5200 a year.
The wife condones this cruelty but shortly thereafter commits
adultery. When the husband sues for divorce is it not just to
allow the wife some form of compensation for her loss of
earning capacity?
(By analogy, in Mah'nke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A. 2d 923
(1951), a father of a five year old girl shot and killed the
child's mother in the presence of the child. The blast from the
gun knocked a part of the mother's skull onto the kitchen
table; the mother's body was bent backwards over a chair
with both her head and feet resting in a pool of blood. The
father kept the child in the presence of the mother's body for
about six days and then took the child to another house where,
in the presence of the child, the father committed suicide with
a shotgun and in the process splattered the child with his
blood and fragments of his body. The court allowed the child's
action to recover for emotional distress, saying that the rule
prohibiting a child from suing a parent could not logically
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be applied where, as there, it would not unduly impair the
discipline and harmony of the household.)
It is the conjecture of this writer that the above reasoning,
along with a vague notion of property division, is what the
dissenting justices in Ba~ytop had in mind or were subconsciously reaching toward, and that the differences in the
views of the majority and dissenting justices turned on the
questions of causation and damages for loss of earning capacity: The lengthy record in Baytop contains evidence to
support the conclusion that the wronged wife had always
been of a nervous disposition and shortly before the divorce
had suffered severe emotional shock because of the tragic, suicidal death of her mother. The majority of the court may
have felt that causation was not sufficiently proved. (See
Bowles v. May, 159 Va. 419, 438 166 S. E. 550 (1932) where
the court states the strict rules applicable to proof of causation of physical injury resulting from emotional distress.)
As for damages, the majority of the court probably concluded that the wife had not suffered a meaningful loss of
earning capacity because her period of disability, if any, occurred during the summer vacation when she, a schoolteacher,
would probably not have been working even if not disabled.
If the Virginia court is willing to take the wife's loss of
earning capacity into account in fixing "alimony" or settling
property rights, then when the husband's "tort" which
caused the loss does not involve a physical touching (and it
did not in Baytop) the court must: (1) recognize and define
the "torts" which are peculiar to the marriage relation, or
(2) at least recognize the dictum in Bowles v. May, supra as
being law for purposes of fixing "alimony" or settling property rights. That dictum is to the effect that wherd a wrong
was wilful or wanton there need be no physical "contact" by
the tortfeasor to enable the wronged party to recover for
physical injury resulting from emotional distress. 159 Va.
419, 437, 166 S. E. 550 (1932).
Mr.Baytop 's small farm and his equity inhis tractor should
not be forgotten; should Mrs. Baytop have an interest in the
property acquired by her husband during marriage?
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Property Rights and the Modern-Day Wife
In the Smith case, supra, the wife was also a working wife,
and in addition, had inherited the sum of $8,100.00 shortly
before the divorce. The wife consistently had earned more
money than the husband; the husband obtained an a vincdo
divorce on the ground of adultery. By using the wife's inheritance the parties had purchased a home which was conveyed to them as tenants by the entirety; the wife contributed
approximately $8,100.00 for the down payment and incidental
expenses, a $4,500.00 deed of trust note for the balance owing
had been curtailed in the sum of $522.70 from the joint earnings of the parties. Further, husband and wife owned jointly
a 1955 automobile in which they had an equity of $1,020.00;
this and an earlier automobile had been purchased from their
joint earnings. However, it is clear that the wife contributed
substantially more toward the purchase of the two cars than
did the husband.
Writing for a unanimous court, Mr. Justice Spratley held
that there should be an equal division of the property between
the husband and wife and that this partition could be effected
in the divorce suit.
On the facts in that case equal division of the property can
be defended on at least three grounds: First, the desirability
of security and certainty of executed transactions because of
the difficulty, if not impossibility, of discovering the subjective
intent of the donor of a gift that is absolute on its face; second,
a growing belief that marriage is a more or less equal economic, as well as social, partnership; and, third, the informality and long duration of the marriage relation often
renders a full and accurate accounting impossible, or at least
impracticable. (In Smith the husband and wife, both salaried
employees, had records of their earnings and records of their
disbursements for hard goods. Even so, it took eighteen pages
of testimony to establish a rough calculation as to their respective earnings and disbursements.)
What is more difficult to defend is the court's suggestion
that division of property between husband and wife will take
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place only when they have expressly agreed to hold the
property jointly. (In other words, all the divorce court can do
under Section 20-107, 1950 Code of Virginia is to partition
property which husband and wife have previously agreed to
hold jointly. 200 Va. 77 at 82, 104 S. E. 2d 17 at 22.)
Failure of a husband and wife to express an intent for
joint ownership should not be conclusive. For example, if a
husband's and a working wife's relationship evolved into one
in which the wife paid all the bills for food and clothing (or
other expendibles) and the husband used his funds to purchase
stocks, bonds, or realty and placed them in his name, should we
conclude that upon dissolution of the marriage the wife had no
interest in the property which stood in the husband's name?
Section 20-107, 1950 Code of Virginia states that the court
" ... shall make such decree as it shall deem expedient concerning the estate . . . of the parties of either of them .... "
"Expedient" means "apt and suitable to the end in view".
However, as the court appeared to interpret it in Smith, an
"expedient" division of the property meant only "such division as the parties to the marriage have agreed upon at the
time they acquired the property." The language of Section
20-107 is presently broad enough to enable Virginia courts to
adopt the principles for property division subsequently suggested in this note and this writer is confident that many
trial judges have felt tempted upon disolving a marriage to
work some division of property other than that owned jointly.
For those readers who feel that no opinion as to the interpretation of a statute is legally noteworthy unless the interpretation be made by solemn men in black robes the writer offers
the decision in Philips v. Philips, 106 W. Va. 105, -144 S. E.
875 (1928). In that case the court interpreted a West Virginia
statute containing the same language as Section 20-107, 1950
Code of Virginia as permitting a trial court to make an equitable division of real estate between husband and wife. As a
later West Virginia case expressed it, the statute "gave the
court almost unlimited control of the property of the parties
in a divorce proceeding." Selvy v. Selvy, 115 W. Va. 338, 177
S. E. 437 (1934). (So far as this writer can determine the
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Philips case has never been cited to or by the Virginia court
although the reasoning employed in the case seems irrefutable:
The West Virginia statute speaks of dissolution of marriage
as well as divorce. Dissolution refers to annulment. Dower,
curtesy, and other marital rights do not exist in a void
marriage. Therefore, the purpose of the statute must have
been to give trial courts authority to make an equitable
division of all of the estate of the parties, not merely dower or
curtesy interests.)
Later West Virginia cases appear to cast doubt on the
Philips case and an amendment to the West Virginia statute
compelled the court to change the interpretation which
emerged from the Philips case. The rise and fall of the
doctrine of equitable division in West Virginia can be
pegged out by scanning the following cases: Tuning v. Tuning,
90 W. Va. 457, 111 S. E. 139 (1922) ; Philipsv. Philips, supra;
Burdette v. Burdette, 109 W. Va. 95, 153 S. E. 150 (1930);
Smith v. Smith, 110 W. Va. 82, 157 S. E. 37 (1931); Games
v. Games, 111 W. Va. 327, 161 S. E. 560 (1931); Selvy v.
Selvy, supra; Wood v. Wood, 126 W. Va. 189, 28 S. E. 2d 423
(1943); State v. Worrell, 106 S. E. 2d 521 (W. Va.) (1958).
It is submitted that Gum v. Gum, 122 Va. 32, 94 S. E. 177
(1917), Barnes v. American Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 130
S. E. 902 (1925), and Smith v. Smith (the Virginia case supra)
do not stand firmly in the way of the Virginia court coming
to the conclusion that Section 20-107, 1950 Code of Virginia,
permits the trial courts to make an equitable division of the
property of husband and wife in a divorce or annulment proceeding. Any statements to the contrary in each of the above
cited Virginia cases are but dicta-dicta which had their
origin in the fact that there is no statute extinguishing dower
or curtesy upon divorce from bed and board (except where
the decree makes the separation perpetual and then only as
to after-acquired property) and the court in Gumt found it
necessary to use what is now Section 20-107 to extinguish
dower when awarding a divorce from bed and board. There
is also evident in some of the Virginia cases an overeagerness
to confuse division of property with the transfer of property
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as a means of paying alimony. (The latter is prohibited in
Virginia.) The two ideas are certainly interrelated, but yet
distinct: alimony is for future support; property division is
in recognition of the past efforts of the spouse claiming a
share of the property which is nominally owned by the other
party to the marriage. Confusing these two ideas seems to
have been one of the things that started the retreat from the
Philipscase in West Virginia. (Burdettev. Burdette, supra.)
Is there any rational basis to support a belief that the
Virginia court should give Section 20-107 its natural meaning
and allow trial courts to attempt an equitable division of property upon divorce or annulment?
A long line of cases in a related area might be of help in
providing an answer: The overwhelming weight of authority
is to the effect that if a man and woman live together under
a mistaken, but bona-fide, belief that they are husband and
wife, upon separation they are entitled to an equitable division
of the property accumulated by them while living togetherregardless of who holds the "legal title" to the property. To
reach this result the courts apply "principles of equity," or
deem the arrangement a "partnership," or engage in other
palpable fictions or distortions of law. (The cases are collected and analyzed and references to related annotations are
found in "Rights and Remedies in Respect of PropertyAccumulated by Man and Woman Living Together in Illicit Relations or Under Void Marriage," Annot., 31 A. L. IR. 2d 1255
(1953).
That such unanimity of result is reached in the various
jurisdictions probably stems from a growing realization that
present day men and women living together are both-economic
and social partners and from the realization that the supposed
wife or husband has lost "something" because of the lack of
a legal marriage. In terms of property, that "something"
the "husband" or "wife" has lost is his or her contingent
marital rights in the property of the other upon the death of
the other, and the right to support. The right to a share of
the husband's estate upon his death is one of the very rights
which a wife loses when divorced in Virginia but the Virginia
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court, as yet, is not willing to recognize that Section 20-107
enables trial courts to recompense the wife for her loss by
making an equitable division of the property of husband and
wife in the divorce proceeding.
Does it not appear strange that a man and woman "innocently living in sin" are more likely to be justly treated by
the courts than a legally married couple?
A further basis for the spreading realization that even the
"non-working" wives have an interest in property accumulated during the marriage is that the value and cost of the
type of personal services performed by an industrious housewife (and particularly mothers of young children) have increased tremendously in the last decade. To obtain comparable services a husband (in the low and middle income
brackets) would often have to expend far greater sums than
are spent in maintaining the wife. With what is perhaps
feminine logic, it can be said that the money thus "saved"
represents a contribution by the housewife toward the acquisition of the family's property. It must be admitted, however,
that the argument stated here rests in part on the assumption
that the acquisition and maintenance of a household ranks
equally on the scale of values of the husband and wife; it is
doubtful that this is often the case since women probably derive more psychic satisfaction from the intangible values associated with "household" than do men.
What Would Constitute An Equitable Division
Property Acquired During the Marriage?

of the

It is not anticipated that the suggestion that a wife is entitled to property division upon divorce or annulment will be
sympathetically received by many male members of the community. However, in testing this proposal on a few members
of the bar this writer was surprised to find that most of them
(after turning down their wives' hearing aids) agreed that
a wife "should" be entitled to property division; their greatest concern was that there be some degree of certainty as to
the portion to which the wife was entitled. One lawyer stated
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that he would like to be able to advise his clients, in advance
as to their rights when they acquire property and suggested
a solution of each party being entitled to a one-third interest
in the property of the other unless the property was conveyed
to them jointly in which event each would take one-half.
Most non-community property states that give their courts
statutory authority to make an equitable division in divorce
proceedings follow a rule of thumb of transferring to the
wife one-third of the property acquired during the marriage.
27B C. J. S9. Divorce, §295 (6) (1959) ; variations from the rule
of thumb are made according to a variety of circumstances,
including the ratio of contributions. 27B C. J. S. Divorce,
§295 (2) (1959).
Similar solutions can be reached in Virginia either by new
legislation or by an understanding interpretation of the present language of Section 20-107. The legislative solution could
adopt a rule of one-third except where the property was
owned jointly, saving for further adjustment situations where
there was fraud, mutual mistake, or a true resulting trust.
Arbitrary though this division may be in some cases, it would
have the advantage of certainty and would enable parties to
adjust their methods of property acquisition to more accurately reflect their ratio of contributions.
By reference to statutes and common law in related areas,
our court, if willing to concede that Section 20-107 authorizes
an equitable property division, could discover a rule of thumb
which would entitle the wife (or husband) to "one-third"
interest in the property of the other: (1) Common law dower
recognizes that even a non-workng wife's share is a life
estate in one-third of the realty and the wife forfeits.this right
upon divorce. The increased legislative respect for the property interests of a wife, as evidenced by moving her to the
second class of descent (Va. Code Ann., §64-1 (1950) as
amended), coupled with some probability that the estate of
the husband upon divorce will not be as large as his estate at
the time of death, provides some basis for reasoning that the
wife's interest upon divorce should be one-third in fee rather
than a commuted life interest based upon the life expectancy
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of both parties. Section 64-11, 1950 Code of Virginia, giving
a surviving wife a one-third interest in fee in the husband's
personalty is further evidence that the legislature presently
regards one-third as being the proper share even of a nonworking wife in property standing in the name of the husband.
(Compare the above reasoning process with that in School
Board v. School Board,197 Va. 845, 851, 91 S. E. 2nd 654, 659
(1956)). However, where husband and wife have expressly
agreed to acquire property jointly, in the interest of certainty
of executed transactions where the actual intent of the parties
is difficult to determine, and to reduce the probability of the
court having to attempt an accounting between husband and
wife, the court could retain the rule adopted in Smith v. Smith,
supra, namely: Where husband and wife have expressly
agreed to own property jointly they will be deemed equal
tenants in common without regard to the ratio of contributions.
Whether to give a greater interest to the working wife or
to one who has made contributions from her own funds is
perplexing. To take her contributions into account and thus
depart from the suggested one-third principle works against
certainty of outcome and compels an attempt at accounting
between the parties. Failure to take her monetary contributions into account could result in the grossest kind of personal
injustice as where, in the example earlier given, the wife paid
living expenses and the husband used his funds to purchase
property in his own name. As stated before, most courts
which attempt such equitable division do consider the ratio
of contributions in determining the proper share of each
party, and this, it is submitted, is probably a more just
attitude.
All of the above suggestions are subject to the qualification
that the court continue to be ready to relieve against fraud,
mutual mistake, or impose a resulting trust when warranted
by established principles.
It might be added that fault in causing the divorce should
not be controlling in making such property division as the
property to be divided is usually acquired by the efforts of
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husband and wife prior to time the ground for divorce arises.
That fault usually will have little or no bearing on property
division will become apparent to our trial judges as they are
plagued by the alimony and property division questions arising in divorce cases based upon Virginia's new ground for
divorce, separation for three years. Va. Code Ann. §20-919
(1950) as amended. See also Adjudication of Property Rights
of Spouses in Action for Separate Maintenance, Support, or
Alimony Without Divorce, Anot., 74 A.L.R. 2d 316 (1961).
If the suggestions in this note are adopted the proper order
for disposing of property rights upon divorce will be: First,
adjudicate that each party holds as his or her separate property that which was owned separately before the marriage
unless there has been an express agreement to hold such
property jointly; second, make an equitable division of the
property acquired during the marriage, including property
jointly owned; and, third, determine according to previously
established principles the amount of alimony, if any, the wife
now requires. (See Ritz,Economic Liquidation of Bankrupt
Marriages,Lectures Presented at the 1957 Legal Conference
of the Virginia State Bar Association and the Virginia State
Bar.
Of course there is a strong probability that the work load
on courts will be increased if these suggestions are adopted,
but there is also a strong probability that after a spate of
cases interpreting the statute more husbands and wives will
adjust their property rights upon divorce by contract. At
the present time the usual bargaining levers a wife has in
negotiating a property settlement are her right to alimony,
if any, and her right to share in jointly owned .property.
Placing the parties in a more equal bargaining position, one
in which the question of who held legal title to property was
not controlling, could increase property settlements, particularly if there were some degree of certainty as to the respective rights of each party in the property standing in the
other's name.
All of the above has been by way of suggestion and is
addressed to lawyers and judges; if ignored by them, then
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some advice should be offered to the married persons who
have to live under the law made by judges and lawyers:
Assuming that you have your selfish interest in mind, make
certain that the legal title to all property you buy is put in
your name and, if you are a working woman, make your husband buy the groceries while you accumulate the property.
Our judges are baffled when you individually hold the "legal
title" to property acquired during the marriage.

